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estate In the preceding chapters we have examined the history and the complex de-
input tails of foreign exchange and trade policy and have discussed quantitative
measures of the effects of these policies on efficiency and growth. In this
results chapter we evaluate the influence of South Korea's economic growth on em-
ediate ployment and income distribution. We also assess the main factors at work
lied a in the rapid growth of the South Korean economy since the early l960s, par-
these ticularly the role of foreign exchange and trade policy, by drawing as much as
possible on our previous analysis. Then after summarizing the lessons of the
1
table two liberalization episodes, we shall caution against hasty generalizations
g
from the South Korean experience.
'ciates
corn-
EFFECTS OF GROWTH ON EMPLOYMENT
milar.
The rapid growth of the Korean economy was documented in Chapter 2. Be-
fore discussing the causes of this performance, however, it is appropriate to
analyze its effects on employment and income distribution.
In fact, the rapid growth of the 1960s was accompanied by a steady de-
cline in the rate of unemployment, particularly in the nonfarm sector (Table
11—1). In addition, the nonfarm proportion of the population was steadily
rising, exceeding 50 percent by 1970. At the same time, farm population de-
clined not only relatively but also absolutely from a peak of 16.1 million
in 1967 to a low of 14.4 million in 1970.
Unemployment declined because job opportunities in the nonagricultural
219220 AN OVERVIEW
TABLE 11—1
Farm and Nonfarm Population and Unemployment, 1957 to 1972
Nonfarm Nonfarni
Population Household
•Farm Nonfarm as PercentUnemploy-Unemploy-
PopulationPopulation of Total ment Ratement Rate
(millions) (millions)Population(percent)(percent)
1957 13.6 9.4 40.8 5.9 na
1958 13.8 9.9 41.8 6.2 na
1959 14.1 10.2 41.8 5.8 na
1960 14.6 10.5 42.0 7.5 na
1961 14.5 11.4 43.9 7.9 na
1962 15.1 11.5 43.3 8.3 na
1963 15.3 12.0 44.1 8.2 16.4
1964 15.6 12.4 44.5 7.7 14.4
1965 15.8 12.8 44.8 7.4 13.5
1966 15.8 13.5 46.0 7.1 12.8
1967 16.1 13.8 46.1 6.2 11.1
1968 15.9 14.5 47.8 5.1 8.9
1969 15.6 15.4 49.7 4.8 7.8
1970 14.4 17.1 54.3 4.5 7.4
1971 14.7 17.4 54.2 4.5 7.4
1972 14.7 18.0 55.1 4.5 7.5
NOTE: na—not available. Since the coverage and method of labor force survey
changed in 1963, the labor force statistics available for the period prior to 1963 were not
consistent with those for the later period. All data other than total population given in
this table for 1960—62 were therefore estimated by linking the old survey data with the
new data (two different survey results were available for 1963).
SouRcE: Bank of Korea, Economic Stotistics Ycorbook, 1973, p. 6; Economic Plan-
ning Board, Major Economic Indicaors, July 1973, p. 96; Economic Planning Board,
Korea Statistical Yearbook, various issues prior to 1964.
a
sectors rapidly increased. Table [1—2 shows that the rate of growth of popula-
tiori dropped steadily throughout the 1960s. From a high of 3.2 percent per
annum in 1961, it declined to 1.8 percent by 1970. The growth of the total
labor force, however, showed a fairly high rate of increase from 1960 to
1972, although there were ups and downs reflecting moderate changes in
participation rates. The farm labor force has declined since 1965, decreasing
at a rate of 2.1 percent in 1971.
Job opportunities expanded rapidly, particularly in the manufacturing
sector, the leading sector of the economy (Table 11—3). At the same time,
growth in manufacturing stimulated rapid increases in output and employ-



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































GROWTH AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 223
Growth in employment opportunities in manufacturing was rapid mainly
because of large increases in investment and output which created a demand
for workers. The growth in output was achieved through labor-intensive meth-
ods. In many other countries rapid growth in manufacturing output is accom-
panied by a rapid increase in labor productivity because of a trend toward
more capital-intensive methods. In Korea, by contrast, manufacturing em-
ployment grew very rapidly between 1957 and 1967, at 9.6 percent per an-
num, while labor productivity lagged behind at an annual rate of increase of
about 2.6 percent. From 1967 to 1972, however, productivity increased much
more, at an average of 11.9 percent per annum. These changes were a function
of variations in the growth in real wages. In 1959, real monthly earnings of
manufacturing workers reached a peak of 8,902 won in terms of 1970 prices
(Table 11—3). By 1964 real monthly earnings had declined to 7,549 won
but they began to rise again in 1965. After surpassing the 1959 level in 1967,
they registered spectacular growth until 1970. This increase continued, though
at a somewhat slower rate, until 1972. By 1971, the 1964 level of earnings
had doubled. The rapid growth in real wages since 1967 was the result'of in-
creasing tightness in the labor market and shortages of skilled labor. In con-
trast to the earlier period 1957 to 1967, it was correlated with much more
rapid increases in labor productivity and slower growth in employment. Be-
tween 1967 and 1972, the growth rate of employment dropped to 7.2 percent
a year.
Even though manufacturing employment grew less rapidly after 1967, the
rate of growth from 1957 to 1972 averaged 8.8 percent per annum. Mean-
while, total nonagricultural employment increased by 6.3 percent per annum.
One reason for this good performance was the government's willingness to
allow wage rates to be set by competitive forces. Labor was not thoroughly
unionized nor did the government press for minimum wages. Nonagricultural
wages more accurately reflected the opportunity cost of labor in the tradi-
tional agricultural sector than they do in the typical less developed country
where government policies combined with union pressures keep wages in the
modern sector artificially high. Furthermore, by permitting the South Korean
price structure to remain largely consistent with world prices, the government
provided incentives to concentrate production in labor-intensive exports and
home goods and to import capital-intensive goods rather than to substitute
for imports. Labor absorption was rapid, at least until the very late 1960s
when labor shortages began to appear and wages started to rise very rapidly.
GROWTH AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Though it is difficult to determine the effect of South Korea's rapid growth on
income distribution, bits and pieces of evidence suggest that the distribution
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has been quite even. In fact surveys reveal that among Korean households than t
expenditure on consumption tends to be more nearly equal than itis else- very r
where in the world and that from 1964 to 1970 this distribution seemed to ties art
improve.'
Farm incomes are a notable case in point, thanks to a reform that wages.
was begun under the U.S. military occupation and completed by the Korean tions ii
governmentin 1949. The net result seems to be a remarkably even division vast PC
of land and income. Nor is there much disparity between farm and nonfarm ing cia
income as the following table shows:2 lives





(won) (won) The S
effecti
1961 1,978 2,610 restrai
1964 3,657 3,880
1968 7,383 8,400 relatjv
1971 13,432 17,349 turn 01
dema
Though manufacturing wages have generally been higher than farm wages, 1965.
the cost of living is probably lower in the country where farm workers often the p
till their own vegetable gardens. Of course most farm work is seasonal, but thoug
even so Korea appears to be free of the large differences between rural and age in
urban income typical of other less developed countries. margi
This impression is reinforced by data on average farm household income.1 return'




fi Farm Household Income per Wage Income rms
Income (won) Worker (won) (won)
would,•
1964 125,692 56,618 46,560
1968 178,959 87,297 100,800 and or
1971 356,382 179,990 208,128 andf
tairia
Totalfarm income, including income in kind, far exceeds annual wage income site su
of production workers in manufacturing, but farm income per worker was level 0
somewhat greater than nonfarm income per worker in 1964, a good agricul- alloca
tural year. in 1968 and 1971 farm income per worker was probably a bit less binati
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sehold than the average manufacturing wage. Even if these calculations are only
very rough, they lead to the same conclusion that rural-urban income dispari-
med t- tiesare small.
0 Wages in nonagricultural sectors have tended to follow manufacturing
-m that wages. Market forces set the rates and because there are no great imperfec-
Korean tions in the market disparities between sectors do not arise. In Korea where
vast poois of the unemployed and the underemployed are unknown, the work-
•onfarm ing class, both urban and rural, which forms the great bulk of the population,
lives on an income that is nearly uniform. If data on income distribution were
• available they would probably show that even the conspicuous wealth of a few
entrepreneurs in Seoul is not enough to reverse the apparent pattern.
FACTORS PROMOTING RAPID GROWTH
The South Korean economy has not suffered from any constant deficiency in
effective demand. Except for 1958—61 and 1964 when effective demand was
restrained by either deflationary monetary and fiscal policy or by political
turmoil, investment demand since the Korean War has tended to be excessive
• relative to the supply of savings, and inflation has been acute. The rate of re-
turn on investment has tended to be high as may be inferred from the large
demand for loanable funds that persisted despite very high interest rates after
wages, 1965. Borrowing at these high rates increased continually throughout most of
often the period from 1963 to 1971 and finder's fees for loans were common. Al-
tal, but though many bank loans were subsidized in one way or another and the aver-
ral and age interest paid on them was probably only about two-thirds the official rate,
marginal borrowers had to pay the high rates which indicates that the rate of
return on marginal investments was at least as great. This inference is cor-
roborated by direct measurements. For example, Gilbert Brown has estimated
from national accounts data that the average rate of return on new investment
was 20 to 30 percent. He also cites direct estimates based on data from eleven
firms that in late 1965 the average rate of return was about 28
The South Korean economy has exhibited the characteristics that theory
would predict for an underdeveloped country where labor is abundant and
capital scarce—a high rate of return on capital, vigorous investment demand,
and meager investable resources. The main constraints on growth are savings
and foreign exchange. The factors that foster rapid growth are those that sus-
• tamand complement heavy investment demand, those that increase the requi-
income site supply of savings, those that earn the foreign exchange needed when the
• er was level of effective demand is high, and, finally, those that foster efficient resource
•igricul- allocation, evidenced by a very low incremental capital-output ratio. The corn-
bit less bination of these four factors produces a result that tends to be self-sustaining;
•
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for rapid growth stimulates demand in nearly all sectors of the economy. As possjb
investment proves ever more profitable, an accelerator effect comes into play. tate. j
Growthgenerates still more growth and in the consequent enthusiasm, pre-
dictable setbacks turn out to be temporary as entrepreneurs become convinced done.
that the resumption of growth is inevitable. relatjo
In addition to these factors, which in varying degrees influence the growth that h
of most developing countries, there are some that are peculiar to Korea. promo
Though they have not yet been analyzed in any detail, they ought to be men- coopei
tioned for they contributed to a favorable environment for investors and charac
helped sustain brisk investment demand. For example, the work force in
Korea is highly educated by the standards of most less developed countries. develo
In 1970 the adult literacy rate was 88 percent,6 and the proportion of primary- finance
school-age children attending primary school was 97 percent.7A highly edu- for sh(
cated work force, it might be argued, was more easily trained and was a factor ported
in the high levels of efficiency and productivity achieved, go Ufl(
South Korea also has an abundant supply of entrepreneurial and mana- analyz(
gerial expertise. Although very few Koreans became managers under the conclur
Japanese colonial regime, it did not take them long to develop a managerial
class after the liberation. A large proportion of them immigrated from North
Korea, but many of the most successful entrepreneurs are of southern origin. SUPP,
No significant number of managers and entrepreneurs are foreign. Foreign di-
rect investment has been exceedingly small, only about 7.4 percent of total The su
foreign investments and loans between 1959 and 1971.8 l960s
Another advantage favoring Korea's economic development was the poli- inflatio
tical stability that prevailed during the period of most rapid growth. Park
Chun Hee has made economic develo ment the s mbol of his government's
His efforts have been aided by Korea's cultural homogeneity. Dis-
putes over language and among ethnic groups have not been important in W
South Korean politics, cent of
South Korean development has also benefited from the weakness of the
labor movement which so far has produced few powerful, organized unions. of
In the Korean system of industrial organization, which in many ways is sinu- tance p
lar to the Japanese, employees tend to remain with one firm for life, loyal to and the41
their paternalistic employers. Because the labor force is docile and unaccus-
tomed to collective bargaining, upward pressure on wages is negligible except In
when manpower is scarce. Stable real wage rates helped to keep profits high sible
and to stimulate investment demand. ratio
Finally, ties with Japan encouraged growth. Although their colonial re- an
gime was extremely unpopular, the Japanese did manage to build a strong out the c
• industrial base in Korea before the war. Much of it was destroyed during the declined
• war, and the subsequent departure of Japanese managers was temporarily plentiful





































SUPPLY OF SAVINGS 227
possible in Korea and they had provided an example for the Koreans to imi-
tate. Imitation seemed all the more sensible since the Japanese, who had an
economy of their own to rebuild, appeared to know how the job should be
done. Accordingly, the Koreans adopted the technology, the approach to labor
relations, the expansionary psychology, and many of the government policies
that had worked so well for the Japanese. As a result, the emphasis on export
promotion, the system of trade and foreign exchange controls, and the close
cooperation between the public and private sectors that are reputed to be
characteristic of Japan alone are typical of South Korea as well.
Investment demand, however voracious, cannot by itself sustain economic
development. It must be matched by a rate of savings that is high enough to
finance the investments desired. Ample foreign exchange is also important,
for shortages can restrict realized investment by curtailing the supply of im-
ported raw materials and capital goods. And if inefficiencies in production
go uncorrected, an economy can suffer from progressive debility. Having
analyzed these issues in the preceding chapters, we shall now present our
conclusions.
SUPPLY OF SAVINGS
The supply of savings, both domestic and foreign, was abundant during the
1960s but not large enough to satisfy total investment demand because of an
inflationary gap that has persisted throughout most of the period since 1963.
Foreign Savings.
We noted in Chapter 7 that foreign savings have remained about 10 per-
cent of GNP since 1960 (Table 7—4),whileover the years their nature has
changed. In the post-Korean War period, most foreign savings took the form
of foreign aid grants from the United Nations and from U.S. bilateral assis-
tance programs. In the early 1960s, foreign aid loans began to replace grants
and then, from 1966 onwards, commercial loans from a variety of countries
became the dominant source.
In Chapter 7, we estimated that foreign savings might have been respon-
sible for about 4 percent of total growth, assuming the average capital-output
ratio between 1960 and 1970 was about 2.5.Thatis, what appeared to be
an annual growth rate of 10 percent might have been closer to 6 percent with-
out the contribution of foreign savings. By the early 1970s, foreign savings had
declined in importance for two reasons. Domestic savings were becoming more
plentiful and because the capital-output ratio has tended to increase, growth
per dollar of imported capital had apparently deteriorated.228 AN OVERVIEW
Large importation of foreign capital led to heavy debt service by 1970.
Since 1971 the burden has become less onerous.
Foreign commercial borrowing probably was excessive in the late l960s.
A divergence between social opportunity costs and the private costs of for-
eign capital made foreign borrowing more attractive than it should have been.
The government originally encouraged all forms of foreign borrowing, but Y
had to discourage short-term transactions after 1970 under an IMF standby
agreement.
1
There is little evidence that reliance on foreign aid was inordinate. Be-
1
cause aid receipts were usually grants, especially in the early 1960s, they 1
cost Korea little while yielding high rates of return. It is true that many of U
the grants may have discouraged domestic savings, but at the time, South U
Korea was desperately poor and needed the additional resources both for I'
consumption and investment.
Domestic Private Savings.
Although foreign capital sparked the growth of the South Korean econ-
omy, domestic savings eventually sustainedit.In 1960 domestic savings
financed only about 20 percent of total gross investment. By 1972 this pro- P
portion had risen to about 75 percent (see Table 7—4). P
Business savings (in constant 1970 prices) grew rather slowly after the I
Korean War, but since 1957, they increased quite rapidly, at an average rate
of1 1.8 percent per year between 1957 and 1972 (Table 11—4). As we
showed in Chapter 8, business savings are moderately responsive to interest
1
rates. The elasticity of business savings is 0.34 although the interest rate is
still statistically a significant determinant of business savings (see equation a
(8—15)in Chapter 8). A more significant factor in business savings, however, g
isnonagricultural value added. As value added and profits increase, business
savings tend to increase (there are no reliable profit data; nonagricultural
value added might serve as a proxy). The elasticity of business savings with
respect to nonagricultural value added was 0.67 between 1960 and 1970.
As Table 11—4 shows, household savings have been very erratic, being
I
Governmj
very sensitive to both the rate of inflation and the interest rate on time de- Govj
posits (see equation (8—14) in Chapter 8). Household savings were sub- tant in
stantial while prices were stable during the late 1950s and even greater in 1970, gOt'
the latter '60s after the interest rate reform of September 1965 had raised 15.7
the rates. During periods of low interest rates and high inflation, like the reforms. 1.
early 1960s, household savings were very low and at times quite negative. percent p
At 1.82, household savings were much more elastic than business say- Govi
ings from 1955 to 1970 and they were also quite elastic with respect to the revenues
rate of inflation, revenuesSources of Domestic Savings, 1953 to 1972
























1953 19.47 39.30 —15.09 43.68
1954 4.67 44.13 36.93 85.73
1955 10.65 40.32 30.40 81.37
1956 52.47 40.56 8.77 101.80
1957 41.95 45.38 12.05 99.38
1958 39.43 52.58 22.42 114.43
1959 36.08 62.06 21.16 119.30
1960 54.63 59.91 0.55 115.09
1961 66.33 68.69 5.18 140.20
1962 67.03 88.29 0.59 155.91
1963 66.41 96.77 —17.50 145.68
1964 71.50 96.07 —18.02 149.55
1965 94.38 119.24 22.62 236.24
1966 103.48 128.57 80.65 312.70
1967 128.83 145.39 83.37 357.59
1968 174.90 161.81 86.24 422.95
1969 183.98 174.89 115.34 474.21
1970 206.43 182.85 92.67 481.95
1971 190.45 191.82 49.36 431.63
1972 132.69 241.24 99.73 473.66
Government Savings.
Government savings and business savings have been about equally impor-
tant in total savings since the Korean War (Table 11—4). Between 1953 and
1970, government savings grew quite rapidly, at an average annual rate of
15.7 percent. The growth was most substantial, however, after the 1964 tax
reforms. From 1964 to 1970 government savings increased at a rate of 20.6
percent per annum.
Government savings multiplied both because of rapid growth in tax
revenues and because of a slow rate of increase in current expenditures. Tax





NOTE: The estimates of savings include savings from transfers from






















of GNP in 1953 to more than 10 percent in 1959. By 1964, however, they
had declined to 7.3 percent. After the 1964 tax reforms, revenues reached a
peak of more than 16 percent of GNP in 1971 before declining slightly in
1972.'° In addition, government monopolies contributed rapidly growing
net surpluses which constituted almost 11 percent of central government
revenues in 1972.h1
Government current expenditures grew less rapidly than total govern.
merit revenues from 1962 to 1970, when current expenditures declined from Year
78 percent of current revenues to about 62 percent. Between 1970 and 1972,
current expenditures rose more rapidly than revenues. Much of the govern- 1961
ment nonrecurrent expenditures went to directly productive assets. Between
1963 1963 and 1971, about 14 percent of total government loans and investments 1964
went into mining and manufacturing, 39 percent into electricity, transport, i 1965
and communications, and 25 percent into agriculture, forestry, and fisheries)2 1966
The remainder was invested in housing, education, and other services. Some 1967
government savings were channeled to the private sector through government- 1968
financed loan funds of development banking institutions such as the Korean 1969
Development Bank and the Medium Industry Bank. In 1963, government 1970
funds accounted for more than one-half of all outstanding loans of the bank- 1971
ing sector. After the interest rate reform of 1965, the commercial banks greatly 1972
expanded their loan portfolios, but even in 1970, government funds accounted
for more than one-quarter of total outstanding loans by banking iflstitutiofll.13 Economic
In 1972, about one-sixth of total government savings was allocated to capital a. Th
transfers of this type.14 ducted th
million ac
SUPPLY OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE
and total
1961.
One of the most striking features of the South Korean economy has been the between
rapid growth of foreign exchange earnings. Foreign exchange receipts on cur- one-third





In the early 1960s, a high proportion of total foreign exchange receipts receipts g
were invisibles and derived directly from the presence of a large contingent of dined, an
UN (mostly U.S.) forces stationed in South Korea. Sales of local currency to total forei
UN forces, military procurement, and provision of electricity, transport, water, ment and
and other public utilities to UN installations accounted for almost one-half of, Korea.• ForeignExchange Receipts" Receipts from UN Forces





Year Total ExportsReceipts Total Salescurement Utilities
1961 166.2 42.6 123.6 79.7 35.7 38.4 5.6
1962 179.0 56.7 122.3 86.1 47.2 34.1 4.8
1963 177.2 85.2 91.8 58.3 30.5 22.1 5.7
1964 212.2 115.1 97.1 63.7 26.4 33.2 4.1
1965 298.0 172.2 125.8 74.0 34.1 35.7 4.2
1966 486.8 248.4 238.4 100.9 30.4 65.5 5.0
1967 695.4 320.2 375.2 147.1 35.3 106.7 5.1
1968 889.4 464.9 424.5 177.6 49.3 122.3 6.0
1969 1,102.0 604.9 497.1 207.0 43.1 155.7 8.2
1970 1,306.7 816.0 490.7 190.8 52.3 131.4 7.1
1971 1,523.41,036.8 486.6 173.5 61.3 106.0 6.2
1972 2,159.21,580.0 579.2 192.8 97.6 90.6 4.6
SOURCE: Bank of Korea, EconomicStatistics Yearbook,1973, p. 216; 1970, p. 282;
EconomicPlanning Board, KoreaStatisticalYearbook, 1972, p.406.
a.These figures understate total receipts because they only include transactions con-
ducted through banking channels. For example. in 1971 export receipts totaled $1,132
million according to customs clearance.
and total invisibles about three-quarters of, all foreign exchange earnings in
1961. Receipts from UN forces and other invisibles were relatively stagnant
between 1961 and 1965, however, so that by 1965 they accounted for about
one-third of total earnings. The escalation of the U.S.' effort in Viet Nam
after 1965 brought more troops to South Korea and an increase in military
procurement, both for troops in South Korea and for those in Viet Nam.
South Korean goods were exported to Viet Nam under military procurement
contracts beginning in 1967 and a number of Korean construction firms be-
came involved in military projects in South Viet Nam. Receipts from UN
forces increased rapidly between 1965 and 1969, but other foreign exchange
receipts grew even more quickly. After 1969, receipts from UN forces de-
clined, and by 1971, only 36 percent of invisible earnings and 11 percent of
total foreign exchange receipts could be attributed to U.S. military procure-
ment and other earnings generated by the presence of UN forces in South
Korea.
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TABLE 11-5




























The major reason for the very rapid growth in foreign exchange earnings importa
was the growth of exports. As we indicated in Chapter 6 exports in the l950s tudesa
were negligible and followed an erratic pattern, ranging from a high of $40 and p01
million in 1953 to a low of $17 million in 1958 (Table 6—1). After 1958 ex- Firms
ports began a pattern of uninterrupted growth, exceeding the 1953 level by by tax
1961. From 1962 until 1973, the growth rate of exports averaged 44.8 per- are set
cent per annum every year and reached a high of 98 percent in 1973. Exports are SUCC
increased from less than one-third of total current foreign exchange receipts, and othe
about one-eighth of the total value of imports in 1962, to three-quarters of Wit
all current foreign exchange receipts and almost 65 percent of the value of will Few
imports in 1972. of expa
In Chapter 6, we noted that exports of South Korea are relatively import cannot
intensive so that the net foreign exchange earnings are substantially less than if lierun
the gross earnings. Even if a correction is made for this fact, the ratio of ex- Special ti
ports to GNP and the rate of growth of exports are exceptionally high by
international standards.
s The reasons for the rapid growth of exports are somewhat elusive. Ac-
g
tually exports grew rapidly from a very low level in 1958. But prior to 1964, The
our econometric analysis in Chapter 6 indicated that peither exchange rates Otfi
norexport subsidies could explain the growth of exports. In 1964, the ex- export ea
change rate was unified and the sensitivity of exports to exchange rates and $373 mill
subsidies increased markedly. The estimated elasticity of exports with respect By 1964,
to the purchasing-power-parity official exchange rate was 6.16 and the esti- since the
mated elasticity with respect to subsidies is 4.69. These very high elasticities, however,
however, are suspect because of the limited time period and the few degrees exceeded
of freedom. Nevertheless, recent experience confirms the impression that duced the
Korean exports are highly sensitive to the exchange rate (the latest year for large as ca
which data were used in the econometric work reported in chapters 6 and 8
was 1970). The purchasing-power-parity exchange rate adjusted for realign-
ments in Japanese and European currency revaluations against the dollar, DEMAN1
increased about 10 percent in 1972 and another 10 percent in 1973 (Table
5—7).Thiswas the result of a float of the won in the first half of 1972, the Gold and f4
dollardevaluation in early 1972 and 1973, and the float of other currencies compared
against the dollar. Exports increased 52 percent in 1972 and 98 percent in total Impo&
1973. end-of-the
The increased sensitivity of exports to exchange rates and subsidies may of the annu
be due to the unification of exchange rates and the relative stability of the the year of
purchasing-power-parity effective exchange rate from 1964 to1970. The Dunn1.
elimination of multiple rates removes the uncertainties and administrative costs took place.






































DEMAND FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE
The rapid growth of South Korea's exports cannot be explained simply
in terms of those incentives subject to quantitative measurement. Other very
important factors, perhaps even more important, are the government's atti-
tudes and methods of operating. For example, government officials use moral
and political suasion to urge private entrepreneurs to meet export targets.
Firms who are successful in promoting exports receive favorable treatment
by tax officials, an important incentive in a country where effective tax rates
are set more by administrative procedures than by law. Entrepreneurs who
are successful exporters are publicly acclaimed and feted by the President
and other high officials.
With an atmosphere in which businessmen are certain that government
will reward efforts to export, it is relatively easy to take the substantial risks
of expanding production and capacity for export markets. A businessman
cannot only expect tangible rewards for export performance, but knows that
if he runs into financial difficulties, the government will provide some form of
special treatment to help him out of his troubles.
Earnings on Capital Account.
a
The other major sources of foreign exchange were on capital account.
Official grant aid plus net capital inflows were many times greater than
export earnings for some time after the Korean War. Capital imports reached
$373 million or almost twenty times the level of exports in 1957 (Table 11—6).
By 1964, export earnings exceeded capital account earnings for the first time
since the Korean War. The growth of foreign borrowing in the latter 1960s,
however, exceeded the growth of exports so that until 1969, capital imports
exceeded export earnings. In 1970, restrictions on capital imports again re-
duced them below the level of exports. By 1972, exports were three times as
large as capital imports.
DEMAND FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE
Gold and foreign exchange holdings of South Korea have been relatively ample
compared with total imports. In 1960 they were more than 50 percent of the
total import bill. Despite the rapid growth of the economy from 1963 to 1972,
end-of-the-year foreign exchange reserves were never less than one-quarter
of the annual import bill and were as high as 37 percent of imports in 1964,
the year of the exchange rate reforms (Table 11—6).
During the same period, substantial liberalization of the import regime
took place. The average tariff level declined and quantitative restrictions were






































Official Capital Capital to Mer- Percent
Grant Aid Imports chandise of
Year($ million)($ million)($ million) Exports($ million)Imports
109 — 1953 193 112 305 7.62
1954 139 28 167 6.96 108 —
1955 240 —3 237 13.17 96 29
1956 298 14 312 12.48 99 26
1957 355 18 373 19.58 116 30
1958 319 —7 312 18.35 146 42
1959 229 —17 212 10.60 147 54
1960 256 —1 255 7.28 157 51
1961 207 19 226 5.51 207 73
1962 200 —16 184 3.35 169 43
1963 208 —104 204 2.34 131 26
1964 141 —26 115 .97 136 37
1965 135 9 134 .77 146 35
1966 122 218 340 1.36 245 36
1967 135 299 334 1.00 356 39
1968 121 422 543 1.10 391 30
1969 104 631 735 1.12 553 34
1970 85 582 667 .76 610 34
1971 64 662 726 .64 568 27
1972 51 530 581 .35 740 33
SouacE: Bank of Korea, EconomicStatistics Yearbook, 1973, pp. 222—223 and
various issues prior to 1973.
a. Loan capital, both private and government, short term and long term, net of
amortization payments.
b. Includes reserve position in IMF and special drawing rights.
check, mainly by exchange rate policy. The large devaluation of 1964 raised
the effective exchange rate on imports from 207.39 won to the dollar on a
purchasing-power-parity basis in 1963 to 283.79 won to the dollar in 1965
(Table 11—7). From 1965 to 1970, although the average effective rate de-
clined, it remained higher than at any time during the earlier period 1955 to
1963—except for 1961 when there was a sharp devaluation.





















Effective Exchange Rate on Imports on Purchasing-Power-Parity
Basis, and Growth of Imports, 1955 to 1970
Purchasing-
Power-Parity
Official Tariffs and Effective Growth
Exchange Tariff Exchange Rate Rate of
Ratea Equivalents on Imports Imports
Year(won/dollar)(won/dollar)(won/dollar)($ million)(percent)
1955 99.71 11.67 111.38 327 —
1956 132.10 10.43 142.53 380 16.2
1957 118.12 12.74 130.86 390 2.6
1958 121.80 28.42 150.22 344 —11.8
1959 119.73 65.84 185.57 273 —20.6
1960 135.37 64.86 200.23 305 11.7
1961 244.79 34.42 279.21 283 —7.2
1962 226.57 28.39 254.96 390 37.8
1963 189.32 18.07 207.39 497 27.4
1964 232.22 23.35 255.57 365 —26.6
1965 265.40 28.39 283.79 420 15.1
1966 256.34 23.40 279.74
266.60
680 61.9
1967 243.12 23.48 909 33.7
1968 233.30 22.62 255.92 1,322 45.4
1969 234.53 20.60 255.13 1,650 24.8
1970 240.2[ 20.29 260.50 1,804 9.3
SOURCE: Tables 8—bC and 8—biB.
a. The first three columns are won/dollar rates deflated by a purchasing-power-parity
index, and represent averages over the year. The third column is the sum of the first two
columns.
This is vividly illustrated by even a cursory look at the data in Table 1 1—7.
In 1958 and 1959, imports dropped sharply, even though GNP grew at 5.5
and 4.4 percent in those years. In 1958, there was no devaluation of the offi-
cial exchange rate, but a foreign exchange tax was instituted and a price
stabilization program implemented, both of which raised the effective exchange
rate on imports (on a purchasing-power-parity basis) about 15 percent. The
imposition of the foreign exchange tax was equivalent to a devaluation for
imports. Imports fell by 12 percent in 1958. Part of the reduction in imports
was due to a fall in grain imports as domestic grain production increased
sharply, but imports of consumer goods fell by 25 percent and imports of












tax receipts quadrupled and the effective exchange rate was increased by
another 23 percent. Imports fell by 21 percent. Although grain imports con-
tinued to fall, consumption goods imports fell by almost 50 percent and inter-
mediate goods by almost 10 percent.15
In -January and February of 1961 a large devaluation reduced the value
of the won from 65 to 130 won to the dollar. Grain imports increased by 50
percent, but imports of consumer and intermediate goods imports were sharply
reduced. The net result was a 7 percent decline in total imports even though -
GNPgrew 4.2 percent. 1
In 1964, there was a very sharp reduction in imports of 27 percent. The
official exchange rate was devalued almost 50 percent. The growth of GNP
was 8.3 percent, but there were very substantial reductions in nearly all cate-
gories of imports, including a 50 percent decrease in consumer goods imports. I
The evidence of the sensitivity of imports to exchange rates is corrobo- C
ratedby the regression analysis described in Chapter 8. The regressions which 8
dealt with imports of consumption goods, capital goods, and intermediate
goods, were stable regardless of the time period used. Linear regressions pro-
vided very good fits. The elasticities of imports with respect to the official
exchange rate (ORD) and the level of tariffs and tariff equivalents on imports
(SUBM) are shown in Table 11—8. 81
Consumption goods are by far the most elastic with respect to changes
in exchange rates and tariffs. Imports of capital and intermediate goods are
generally less than unit elastic with respect to the exchange rate, but imports
of intermediate goods are fairly sensitive to changes in tariff rates. Since the
supply of imports to Korea is probably close to infinitely elastic, it can be
assumed that exchange rate changes have a powerful effect -in reducing the
dollar value of imports.
In the late 1960s, the demand for foreign exchange was augmented by
the need to service foreign debt. Beginning in 1970 attempts were made to
restrict the import of foreign capital. By 1971, debt service payments reached
c
$326.6 million on debt of maturity greater than one year. But debt service
payments were still only a small fraction of the total use of foreign exchange
before 1971.
South Korea succeeded in restraining the demand for foreign exchange Cii.
during the period of rapid growth from 1963 to 1972. A less developed econ-
omy, growing at more than 10 percent per annum, can be expected to run -
shortof foreign exchange because of the rising demands for imports. Although E
imports rose rapidly through much of this period, import growth would have
been much greater had it not been for frequent devaluations and maintenance
of the purchasing-power-parity effective exchange rate for imports at a con-
stant level. Furthermore, the stable exchange rate helped stimulate export tui1
























Although South Korean economic policies favored high effective ex-
change rates, especially for exports, these policies caused some loss in govern-
ment revenues and savings. As our analysis in Chapter 9 indicated, less sub-
sidization of exports and higher taxes on imports could have generated some-
what more growth. Nevertheless, the Korean performance was unusually good
compared with the records of other less developed countries.
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
There is no conclusive way to determine whether the Korean economy has
operated efficiently. Because the various empirical methods used in the litera-
ture all have their faults, caution is necessary in discussing measures of effi-
ciency. It is clear, however, that in Korea inefficiency has not been sufficient to
stifle very rapid growth over the decade beginning in 1963. Furthermore, most
TABLE 11—8











































NOTE: Elasticities based on regression equations (8—24),
Chapter 8, and computed at the means of the variables.


















of the conventional measures analyzed in Chapter 10 suggest a low level of C
inefficiency. ti
Prior to the 1964 exchange rate unification and liberalizing reforms, the U
system of exchange rates and trade policy probably did foster inefficiency.
Quantitative restrictions were very important and the exchange rates were
various and widely divergent.
Since 1964, however, the government has followed different policies. Al-
though liberalizing trends have waxed and waned, the fluctuations have been T
minor, never approaching the chaos of the late 1950s. al
In Chapter 10, we analyzed the restrictiveness of the trade policy and a
exchange rate regime in 1968. We saw that in Korea the average level of
nominal protection is low. For manufacturing, the level of nominal protec- th
tion estimated from information on comparative international and domestic
prices was about 10.7 percent in 1968 and is probably much lower today be- 1!
cause average tariff levels have steadily declined. Quantitative restrictions are 0
not an important cause of large differences between international and domestic m
prices. The 77 commodity groups receiving significant protection through ai
quantitative restrictions in 1968 accounted for only 11 percent of total domes- tf
tic sales. m
Unlike many other countries, Korea does not maintain large differences
in nominal protection between industry and agriculture. Average nominal e,
protection was 16.6 for agriculture and 10.7 percent for manufac- fr
turing. General variability of protection among sectors is quite low. When the
Korean economy is measured in constant international prices rather than
constant domestic prices, the total and sectoral rates of growth do not differ
significantly. Emphasis on export promotion has led to rapid growth in the It
most labor-intensive sectors. it
The observations made in Chapter 10 suggest an efficient pattern of
growth. Such inefficiencies that do arise stem from the protection of agricul-
ture and import-competing manufactures. The effective subsidy in 1968 to
agriculture was 21.3 percent (Corden definition) and to manufacturing —4.7
percent. Effective protection is also much higher for import-competing indus-
tries than for export industries and for domestic sales than for export sales in
industries that sell in both export and domestic markets, of
Policies that affect the incentive to import foreign capital can influence
efficiency just as much as policies that affect exports and import substitutes.
In Korea, the incentive to import short-term foreign capital during the 1960s W
was excessive. Domestic inflation, high real and nominal domestic interest
rates, and a failure to devalue smoothly and adequately all contributed to an gr
exaggerated demand for foreign loan capital.
Policies governing credit, interest rates, pricing, the subsidization and rn
management of government enterprises, and taxation also bear on efficiency.'6 re:
a - . .-
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Only partial allowance was made for these policies in our estimates of effec-
0 tive subsidy. It is clear, however, when they are taken into account, that both
the total and the variability of effective subsidies increase.
:y.
re ROLE OF THE LIBERALIZATION EPISODES
The major liberalization efforts in Korea took place in 1964 and 1965. Earlier
en attempts in 1961 and 1962 that had failed of full implementation prompted
rid a return to the multiple exchange rate system in 1963.
f There is no clear correlation between the liberalization of 1964—65 and
the start of rapid growth. In fact, mining and manufacturing output, which
had grown 14.1 percent in 1962 (constant 1970 prices), and 15.7 percent in
1963, registered a gain of only 6.9 percent in the first year of liberalization.
ire Only a poor harvest made 1962 a bad year and only an excellent harvest
tic made 1964 a good one (Table 2—4). The satisfactory performance of 1962
h and 1963 was largely the result of expansionary fiscal policies whereas indus-
trial performance suffered in 1964, despite liberalization, because fiscal and
monetary stabilization were rigidly enforced.
es Nor was the devaluation of 1964 associated with a sudden upsurge of
ial exports. Having touched bottom in 1958, exports grew without interruption
from 1959 on.
he The main argument in defense of liberalization is that it laid the basis
an for a decade of sustained growth, whereas fiscal and monetary policies were
rer responsible for brief deviations from a propensity for substantial real growth.
he It might also be argued that liberalization itself was less important as a direct
influence on the economy than it was as the harbinger ofnew approach to
of exchange rates and trade policy that favored rapid growth.
11 Since liberalization, the effective exchange rates on exports and imports
to have remained high (somewhat higher for exports than for imports—see Table
.7 5—10) while foreign exchange has never become a severe constraint on growth.
The devaluation of 1964 was followed by many others over the next eight or
in nine years, both floating devaluations and discontinuous changes in the value
of the won. Exchange rates had great effect on export performance, particu-
ce larly after the reforms of 1964, and as Chapter 6 demonstrates, the growth of
exports has been the dominant factor in the growth of the economy as a whole.
Os We conclude, therefore, that the unification of the exchange rates and the
stability of the effective exchange rate were powerful stimuli to subsequent
an growth.
By contrast, the interest rate reform of September 1965 was probably of
nd more intrinsic importance in its effect on the rate of growth. The interest rate
reform greatly encouraged household savings which having been negative in240 AN OVERVIEW
1964 became about one-quarter of total domestic savings in 1969. Business f
savings, which had been nearly stagnant from 1962 to 1964, more than d
doubled between 1964 and 1970. Even more important than this boost for
savings was the effect of the interest rate reform on incentives to hold assets p
in different forms. Commercial bank time deposits became the more favored
way to hold savings; the increase in commercial bank deposits far exceeded
the increase in total savings.17 Most loanable funds were controlled by the
commercial banks. Though some of their lending was done at subsidized
interest rates, thus encouraging inefficient use of resources, the commercial
banks could lend in much greater volume than the unorganized money markets
and operate with much lower overhead. The cost to large borrowers was also f
much lower if they borrowed from the commercial banks instead of from a se
myriad of small operators in the unorganized money market. p
The reforms of August 1972 took a different tack. After 1965, no serious a
effort had been made to reduce the rate of inflation. Rather, high nominal re
interest rates and frequent devaluations were supposed to compensate for rapid in
inflation. With the reforms of 1972, low nominal interest rates, stability of the su
exchange rate, and less rapid price inflation were to be the basic elements of be
policy. According to McKinnon (1973), there are important flaws in this new to
policy. A major factor in increasing the money supply in Korea is the discount a
of export bills at very low rates of discount and low rates of interest on the in
bills themselves to exporters. The low rate of interest on the bills increases ta
exporters' demand for this form of credit and the even lower discount rate co
encourages commercial banks to discount the bills at the Bank of Korea, thus
increasing commercial bank reserves. In fact, in the first six months of 1973, gli,
the discount of export bills exceeded the increase in commercial bank reserves, ti
the other sources of reserve creation having undergone a net decline. Because pa
of the discount of export bills, which has become the main source of reserve co
creation, the Bank of Korea has lost effective control of the money supply. se
Under such conditions, it is unlikely that inflation can be held within reason- Pri
able bounds. Added to the inflationary difficulties is the rapid increase in Al
prices of petroleum products and grains, both of which Korea imports in large
amounts. The success of the new policies in the long run, however, will depend thi
on finding ways to bring the money supply back under control. pe4
CONCLUSIONS iflC4
The Korean experience over the decade since 1963, remarkable as it seems to iflf3$
have been, does not necessarily provide a model for other less developed of
countries. There have been a number of special factors operating which are effel
not likely to be replicated in other countries. It was the confluence of those enoCONCLUSIONS 241
factors, no one of them separately, that led to successful growth. First, abun-
dant foreign assistance, particularly during reconstruction after the Korean
tfl War,helped build the infrastructural base for subsequent growth, although the
)r periods of high levels of foreign aid are not coterminous with the periods of
13 most rapid growth. Only a few other countries, having special relationships
withthe United States because of U.S. foreign policy objectives, received as
• much per capita foreign aid.
Second, Korea was able to maintain high and growing levels of govern-
-I
ment savings. Rates of taxation and public enterprise profits rose sharply while
the growth of current expenditures remained moderate. Probably such a per-
formance is only possible in countries where political leaders are powerful and
a secure. In many less developed countries political power is fragmented, the
political process is highly competitive, and ethnic and regional differences are
acute. Policy-makers in such circumstances are unlikely to be able to control
ial revenues and expenditures to the necessary degree. To maintain themselves
id in power, they must use government expenditures as a means of gaining the
he support of particular interest groups. Public enterprises are rarely profitable
of because staffing them becomes a form of dispensing political patronage and
top management posts are filled according to political criteria. Costs are high
nt and productivity low. Prices tend to be kept unrealistically low for fear of
he injuring powerful interest groups by allowing prices to rise. Higher rates of
es taxation yield returns only if they are accompanied by greater expenditures
Lte contrived for the benefit of particular interest groups.
Third, frequent devaluations, either of the discontinuous type or of the
3 gliding peg variety, are seldom feasible where resistance is intense. Discon-
tinuous devaluations typically raise prices sharply for many imported goods,
se particularly for nonluxuries which had not been subject to stringent import
controls. Consumer groups and industrial end-users who would suffer in con-
sequence may resist efforts to devalue. Even gliding devaluations, which raise
fl. pricesof imported goods more gradually, are not always popular. When the
in Allende regime came to power in Chile, it abolished the gliding exchange rate
ge and fixed the foreign-exchange value of the domestic currency, partly because
the gliding peg was politically unpopular. Even Korea abandoned the gliding
peg in 1972 because considerable resistance to devaluations had gathered
among a wide variety of industrialists. Many Korean firms had accumulated
large foreign debts and were financially precarious. Continuous devaluations
increased the amount of their dollar-specified liabilities in terms of won. Other
firms producing mainly for the domestic market saw the costs of imported
to inputs rising and joined the resistance. Exporters, always favored by subsidies
•
.ed of various sorts as well as by frequent devaluations, have not organized an
ire effective counterforce, possibly because they feel they can always count on
)se enough subsidization to make up for losses caused by a failure to devalue.242 AN OVERVIEW
Fourth, government policies toward labor in Korea prevented real wages
from rising except in response to labor shortages in the late 1960s. This af-
fected growth in two ways. Profit rates and returns to capital were high, stimu-
lating high levels of investment. Wage disparities did not arise among sectors;
labor -was efficiently allocated among sectors; and there were no large and
growing pools of wasted labor in the form of unemployed workers. On the
contrary, unemployment rates declined throughout much of the 1960s. r
The lack of pressure from organized labor in South Korea is partly his-
torical accident. During industrialization under the Japanese, labor organiza- i
lions were suppressed and suppression has continued to the present 1n r
many other less developed countries, organized labor is powerful and political si
regimes are dependent on it for support. The demands of labor cannot be
ignored in such circumstances and it would be foolish of the government to in
insist that wages be set by market forces.
Fifth, South Korea underwent a thoroughgoing land reform first under g
the U.S. military government and later under an indigenous Korean govern-
ment. Japanese landowners were expropriated and the subsequent redistribM- re
tion of land was evenhanded. This meant that no large numbers of landless is
laborers streamed into the cities in response to slight differences in urban and ta
rural wage rates. No doubt workers migrated from country to city, but they m
did not overburden the system, since there were more jobs available in the ti
cities than there were migrants to fill them, as the decline in urban unemploy- e
ment rates reveals. The even distribution of land also meant that the organiza- ta
tion of agricultural production could easily be made labor intensive. The ex
result was an efficient use of resources where land and capital were scarce and
labor superabundant. su
A land reform like South Korea's is not easily duplicated in other coun-
tries. Large landholdings, which were in the hands of one group of foreigners, b
the Japanese, were expropriated initially by another group of foreigners, the at
Americans. But when an indigenous government attempts to expropriate land
from major landholders who are politically powerful, the reforms are not
likely to be so sweeping. no;
Sixth, Korean culture places a very high value on education. Since parents
are willing to spend large amounts of their own funds for the education of
their children, they support a vigorous system of high-quality private schools a
throughout the country. Thus, even though public expenditures on education
in Korea are low by international standards, South Korea's literacy rate is one
of the highest in the world. Korea also has a very high proportion of secondary
school and university graduates. Because this large investment in human capi-
tal did not require a commensurate public expenditure, more public resources Th4
could be channeled instead into economic overheads and directly productive
investments. exi
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'es These special factors are lacking in many less developed countries and the
af combination of any number of them is rare indeed. Taiwan is the only less
developed society where strong similarities to Korea are found.
These special factors, however, are not sufficient in themselves to explain
the success of the South Korean economy. Economic policies made an im-
the portant contribution: tax and government expenditure reforms, the interest
rate reforms, the exchange rate reforms, and the general emphasis on export
promotion and reliance on international prices were some of the most critical.
za- There is some evidence that export promotion was a bit overdone—greater
In reliance on tariffs particularly as a source of revenue may have generated
cal slightly more growth—but the bias toward exports was far preferable to a
strong bias in favor of import substitution. The export bias allowed efficient
to industries to establish themselves without being limited in size by the domestic
market. The export bias led to an increasingly open economy and generated a
der growing share of the foreign exchange that lessened the economy's dependence
rn- on foreign capital imports. The subsidization of exports led to some inefficient
bu- resource allocation but did not result in the same distortion of incentives which
ess is often the result of import substitution. Quotas on imports or prohibitive
Lnd tariffs can distort the structure of product prices much more than the instru-
ments typically used to promote exports. Exports are subsidized by tax exemp-
the tions and rebates, subsidization of credit, and subsidization of inputs. The
Dy- effect of these instruments on costs and prices is limited. For example, income
za- tax exemptions can be applied only if a firm is profitable and only to the
he extent that profits are made. Subsidized electricity and transportation rates
Ind typically affect only a small proportion of costs. In theory a direct export
subsidy could be made to have as large a distorting effect as any tariff or
import quota. In fact, direct subsidies have rarely been used. There has always
been a reluctance to use direct subsidies, partly because they must be appropri-
the ated as a specific government expenditure and the effect on the budget is obvi-
nd ous and direct. A tax exemption, however, does not appear directly in the
budget either as an expenditure or as negative revenue. An import quota has
no obvious impact on the government budget. An import tariff except when
nts prohibitive makes a positive contribution to revenue.
of Unfortunately, South Korea's economic gains have been accompanied by
ols a great deal of political repression. Labor unions have been very much dis-
ion couraged, and there exist many cases of employer abuse of unskilled workers,
)ne reminiscent of nineteenth century sweatshops in Western nations. The South
Iry Korean experience does illustrate, however, the effectiveness of price-on-
pt- ented economic policies in initiating and sustaining rapid economic growth.
ces The poor performance in the area of human rights and in the labor policy is
.ive tempered by a favorable performance in terms of income distribution and the
existence of many benevolently paternalistic employers. The relevance of the244 AN
Korean experience to other less developed economies, however, is questionable
at best because it was probably the combination of political, historical, and
cultural circumstances found only in South Korea that made these policies
succeed. In other circumstances they might not work.
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1. See Chenery, Duloy, and Jolly (1973), Chapter 2.
2. Economic Planning Board, Major Economic Indicators, May 1972, pp. 88—89.
Farm wages are reported in terms of a daily wage rate. To get monthly earnings, the
daily wage rate was multiplied by 23.
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4. Average total farm household income is from Ministry of Agriculture and For-
estry, Report on the Results of Farm Economy Survey and Production Cost Survey of
Agricultural Products(1972). Averagetotal farm household income is divided by 2.22
workers per household in 1964, 2.05 workers per household in 1968, and 1.98 workers
in 1971. These figures were estimated from the farm labor force estimates in Table 11—2
and the total number of farm households in Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Year-
book, 1973, p. 104. Manufacturing wages are from p. 254 of the same publication.
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same period. See Major Economic Indicators, 1961—1971, p. 35.
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